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Dam controversies: contested
governance and developmental discourse
on the Ethiopian Omo River dam
State mega-infrastructure projects in developing countries evoke challenges to citizenship and reconstruct the
imagery of statecraft. The Ethiopian government’s construction of a large dam in the Omo River evoked
contesting accounts of development and legitimate governance among a variety of actors. Debates between
relevant actors centre on classic topoi of the ‘development’ discourse but present seemingly irreconcilable
views. In the process, discourses of technocratic expertise claiming to evade ‘politics’ as well as culturally
grounded socio-economic narratives are mobilised. They are juxtaposed here to develop an anthropological
interpretation of the discursive positions, connecting the analysis to a consideration of precarious citizenship
and coercive state consolidation in Ethiopia.
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I n t r o duc t i o n
This paper discusses some socio-cultural aspects of ‘high-modernist’ projects in
Ethiopia. James Scott’s (1998) term is as relevant as ever in today’s globalising world,
where developing countries have taken over an unreconstructed modernism in their
infrastructural and technocratic approach to socio-economic development. While this
brief account does not aim to provide a major new contribution to social theory,
I advance the argument that evolving modernist governance modes in developing
countries like Ethiopia reinvent modes of coercive state legitimacy by grounding their
political practices in global developmental discourse that reflects the practices and
power strategies of elite institutions and ‘donor country’ governments. In the process,
the subjects and citizens of developing countries are seen as entities whose political
agency and identity are to be neutralised or overcome in a technocratic discourse of
developmentalism that allows no counter-voice. Large infrastructural projects in many
countries now appear to be the ‘ideal’ manner in which to realise this and to ground
or extend the authority and ‘legitimacy’ of the state and redefine citizens’ status in
terms of dependency and ‘displaceability’. In the Ethiopian case discussed here, the
state is recast as a strong ‘developmental state’, similar to those seen in Asia in the
1970s–90s but with a notable extension of surveillance techniques, combining classic
policing with military as well as new technological (ICT) means, and ideologically
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anchored in a discourse of technocratic developmentalism. The development path
outlined by the Ethiopian party state elite is not seen as open to critical debate or
alternatives, and does not allow scope for different cultural registers. In its effects,
this phenomenon resembles the classic case described in Ferguson’s (1990) oft-cited
study on Lesotho, but this time more comprehensive, as the state – while acting
quintessentially political – denies its own political role and the very contestability of its
policies.
An anthropological approach to dam impacts (building on the contributions of
Scudder 2005; Johnston and Gracia-Downing 2004 or Campregher 2010) not only
needs to highlight the observable effects such as displacement, livelihood loss and social
decline, but also the dissonances in cultural discourse around dam constructions as state
infrastructural engineering feats incapable of incorporating views and interests of local
people, who often have a long-established relationship to the land in the socio-economic
and ritual sense.
I present the outlines of a multi-vocal debate on modernist engineering in Ethiopia
and assess its political and policy contexts. I do this by presenting a brief descriptive
overview of the several modes or genres of discourse that one can discern in Ethiopia
around the building of the large Gibe III dam in the Omo River, and connect them
to developmental, state building and governance issues. My interpretation is that
the disparity between those discourses – as social and historically situated forms of
presentation of reality, reflecting power and/or hegemonic claims of emerging parties
involved – tends to increase. This makes negotiated compromises, to be established in
discursive spaces delineated by international law, impossible. The positions are seen
to be incommensurable, driven by either monopolising claims to power and ‘being
right’ from the side of governments and the international financial and development
institutions, as well as activist organisations principally opposed to such grand
engineering. Independent academic observers and researchers constitute a fourth group,
usually not entrenching itself in taking position. A fifth party, the local people directly
impacted by the schemes, is seldom heard, because they are inaccessible, ignored in
research or in reporting, shielded off by the government, or sometimes not even
aware (informed) yet of what exactly is happening. In the course of this paper I will
discuss these five forms of ‘discourse’ that I think can be distinguished, and specifically
reflect on the perception of citizens, in this case local people in the project areas, as
‘dispensable’, as surplus populations to be resettled, moved or shifted around as part
of the national project of (re)building the state and consolidating its power (cf. Li
2009, 2010).
My aim in this article is not primarily to bring a judgment on whether schemes
like the Gibe III dam are beneficial or disastrous for development and economic
growth and people’s well-being: it is foremost to show the problematic interplay
of discursively antagonistic parties on an issue of major public interest, as well as
to highlight the production of images of ‘dispensability’ of state citizens, happening
in the wake of economic-modernist projects conceived on the national level and
not on that of the everyday life of citizens and common people in a negotiated
social order. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that dominant political practice of
the main players, notably the Ethiopian state, may have deleterious effects on local
development, livelihoods and political and human rights of the people in the areas
discussed.
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The damming o f E t h i o p i a as a f ea t u r e i n s t a t e
bu i l d i ng
Africa has currently more than 1270 dams, and after a backlash in the 1980s, when
the disadvantages of dams and their aftermath were being taken seriously, a new era of
large-scale dam construction seems to have been started (Richter et al. 2010: 16). The
World Bank, the African Development Bank and obviously African governments are
in the forefront of resuscitating this effort. In 1998 a World Commission on Dams was
founded for the purpose of monitoring this.
Ethiopia is one of the enthusiastic participants in massive dam building. Poverty,
socio-economic ‘backwardness’ and material underdevelopment can, in the view of the
state elite, be decisively pushed back by grand schemes of energy infrastructure building
imposed from above. The building of dams all over the country is one crucial element
in this effort, next to large-scale agrarian land leases to foreign investors (and sometimes
they are connected, for example when grand post-dam irrigation schemes are proposed,
see below). In the past 20 years – since the post-Marxist EPRDF party came to power
in 1991 after a civil war – dams and hydropower stations have been built or expanded
in a significant way1, like the Tendaho, the Tekkeze and the T’ana Beles. But the new
Gibe dam cascade, consisting of a projected five big dams on the Gibe-Omo River in
Southwest Ethiopia, beats all. And even additional dams – beyond the Gibe dams –
have been announced in the 25-year master plan of 2003.2 The Ethiopian government
has shown a perhaps inordinate desire to build these dams and seems to push the donor
community and global financial institutions into supporting this venture financially and
ideologically as being beneficial for development.
Dambuilding also has connectionswith the other hot issue inAfrica: land access and
large-scale (foreign) land acquisitions, because: (a)muchof the landusedbydownstream
peoples on the banks of the Omo River will no longer be inundated and exploited by
flood retreat cultivation, an intricate and essential supplementary food resource for the
local people, and (b) the water collected in the huge lake reservoirs behind the Gibe III
dam (and the future Gibe IV dam) is advertised to be used for large-scale irrigation on
lands to be given out to (foreign) investors, near the dam lake and in some downstream
areas and that are envisaged to import tens of thousands of foreign workers as well.
The two-pronged approach to development was outlined in the Ethiopian
government’s various development plans. The fact that these ambitious plans exist
already makes a good impression on the donor community and the World Bank and
creates goodwill, but often leads to naive or unwarranted assumptions among these
1 Some of them started under previous regimes, such as the Gibe I, Alwero and Tekkeze, dams and
the Finch’a hydroelectric power station. The T’ana Beles hydropower station that started in May
2010 is producing below capacity (460 MW) because of reduced water flows caused by drought.
The resettlement consequences of T’ana Beles were negative (cf. Gebre 2009) and the adverse effects
on Lake T’ana are also problematic. Tekkeze is also precarious and not in optimal use either. The
Gibe II hydropower plant (a turbine tunnel structure) faced serious problems in 2010 due to tunnel
collapse and was still not fully operational in mid-2011.
2 Others are the Chemoga Yeda (five smaller dams on Blue Nile tributaries) and Genale Dawa (two
dams on the Genale river, between Oromiya and Somali regional states), with more to come. The
largest of all is to be the ‘Millennium’ or recently renamed ‘Renaissance’ dam on the Blue Nile. It
was started in 2010 and is to be financed by Ethiopia itself via ‘voluntary contributions’ and bonds
to be bought by the Ethiopian public (notably state employees, many of whom had to donate one
month of salary for it). The plan for building it has in 2011 caused tensions with Egypt.
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donors about the actual processes of implementation, financing, and social and political
effects of the plans. For example, in the 2003 74-page Rural Development Policy and
Strategiesdocument, large-scale agricultural developmentwas announced,muchof it via
foreign investments. In 2010 a new development plan, theGrowth and Transformation
Plan (GTP), was promulgated, a managerial blueprint with many good points though
strongly infused with the ‘revolutionary democratic’ ideology of the ruling party
EPRDF, which sees itself as the vanguard party solely able to direct the national
development effort, on the basis of a political model of top-down implementation
and wholesale re-engineering of Ethiopian rural society (i.e. of smallholder farming and
pastoralism).
The massive and ambitious investment in the national energy structure via mega-
dams is seen as a key strategy both to generate electricity for domestic economic growth
and for the country tobecome energy-independent and even an exporter of hydropower.
Built and ideally financed largely by foreign parties, among them China, the Ethiopian
government hereby escapes domestic accountability pressures and can act politically
independently. Nevertheless, there is a likelihood of tensions being created not only
between local communities and the state but also on the international political level.
Local opinion in Ethiopia is divided on the need for such a massive debt-generating
investment in energy structures, for which there is as yet no domestic demand (and no
sufficient national grid). In addition, and not surprising in view of what is known about
the effects of mega-dams worldwide, social costs as well as group tensions will likely
follow the construction of the dams: forced resettlement, decline of quality of life and
well-being, more water-borne diseases, loss of productive land and incomes, more local
group competition, not to speak of cultural and heritage loss. While beneficial effects
of dams for directly affected local people can in the long run of course not be excluded,
the advantages will first and foremost be on the national level: the sale of dam energy
abroad (planned by the government) is estimated to yield hundreds of millions of US
dollars annually, rivalling the revenue of coffee, the largest export crop. This is in the
expectation that neighbouring countries will continue to need and buy the power for
the coming decades, and also that rainfall over the Ethiopian highlandswill not diminish
over time. Both assumptions are somewhat problematic.3
Needless to say, modernisation ideology is alive and well in Ethiopia, which in
pursuing these multiple dam-building schemes is showing itself to be a classic ‘high-
modernist’ state indeed (cf. Scott 1998: 4), bent on technology-driven ‘development’ and
top-down planning at all cost by a self-declared all-knowing state elite. In this respect,
there is a seamless continuity with earlier socialist-modernist planning in Ethiopia,
which in the 1980s saw large-scale resettlement schemes under the previous, military-
socialistDerg regime, with huge human cost and little economic returns (cf. Pankhurst
andPiguet 2009). The common theme in both regimes is ‘state building’ via development
in the fast-forward mode; and the mega-projects confirm the aims and policies of a state
elite bent on establishing its undisputed hegemony domestically and internationally.
The massive investment in mega-dams and foreign land leases may for recent Afro-
optimist observers mean the reaffirmation of ‘Africa in the world’ and indicate the
hopeful ‘economic upturn’ of a neglected continent long seen as ‘behind’ others (cf.
Juma 2011; Roxburgh et al. 2010). However, one should have an eye for the human
3 See ‘Where thewater ends:Africa’s climate conflicts’ (http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_
ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331) Accessed 15 August 2011.
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costs and the long-term social and environmental problems that may come in the dam’s
wake, and for which several expert warnings were given. Of course, it is easy to neglect
them, especially when one is not a member of one of the local peoples that will be facing
such problems. This is common among the new Afro-optimists who, in a new move
of political correctness, appear to have an eye mainly for the economic growth figures
and not the human elements, political democracy or the nature and durability problems
of this growth. Mega-dams, however, pose many problems that should be considered
holistically and not only economically (cf. Scudder 2005; Cernea 1997; D’Souza 2010).
Local people often observe such a dam project as a constraining grid coming down
on them and disconnecting them not only from their livelihoods but also from the
political process. The analytical point is that the states in question redefine and move
local people to detach them from the land so as to make it a ‘free resource’. This is also
reflected in the legal arrangement in Ethiopia: all land is still state property, not private;
and there being no recognised cultural or even viable economic link between land and
people dependent on it, the latter appear as ‘displaceable’ and as objects easily moved
around.
The G i be I I I p r o j e c t : wha t i s i t ?
The Gibe III dam was started in 2006 and is still under construction, to be completed
in 2013. Its location is 450 km southwest of the capital, Addis Ababa, on the border of
the Wolaitta and the Dawro Zones.4 A work force of ca. 3500 people is busy working
on it, on a large, double-zoned and fenced site virtually closed to the outside world.
The dam is to be a 245-m high barrage in the Gibe-Omo River (Gibe is the name of
the upper course of the river up to the Gojeb tributary). The dam is a roller-compacted
concrete damwith an associated hydroelectric power plant. Its power output is officially
expected to be about 1870Megawatt (MW), more than double the total electric capacity
of Ethiopia from its 2007 level of 814 MW. Notably, in 2008 Ethiopia’s total electrical
power use was not more than 587 MW, so domestic demand is far below the projected
production capacity (even below its capacity at the time). The Ethiopian government
wants to use this and other dams as a resource for generating foreign revenues, planning
electricity export to Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya. The dam is to be operated by the state-
owned Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo). Its initial costs were estimated
at €1.47 bn (US$1.9 bn); in August 2010 they had already risen to €1.7 bn, and are
likely to be higher.
In June 2013 the dam reservoir (ca. 14 bn m3) will have to be filled to power the
hydroelectric plant.5 Thiswill take twoor three years, duringwhich theOmoRiver flow
will greatly dwindle and directly impact riverbank livelihood systems downstream. The
natural flow of the Omo River will be decisively changed in the long run, also because
additional huge irrigation schemes are foreseen.6 The local seasonal flooding along
4 Maps of theGibe III project area can be found in the EEPCo report (2008a),Gibe III Environmental
and Social Impact Assessment, pp. 42–3.
5 See Salini Costrutturi, ‘Gibe III: the Survival figures are obviously incorrect’, Press release, Rome,
30 March 2010.
6 See www.mursi.org/news-items/huge-irrigation-scheme-planned-for-the-lower-omo-valley
(Accessed 2 June 2011), and PM Meles Zenawi’s speech during the 13th Annual Pastoralists’ Day
celebrations, Jinka, South Omo, 25 January 2011.
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the river bank zones, essential for the agrarian and pastoral livelihoods of ca. 180,000
people (see Turton 2010: 4) will be dramatically reduced. Local economic systems will
thereby be affected, despite the promise in the official Gibe III impact assessment
documents that an annual 10-day water release will try to imitate that flooding.7 But
this is economically not helpful for local people. While not all local people can be
assumed to have an inherent, ontological attachment to the landwhere they live or could
not survive without it, social research has shown that for most communities a long-
established, meaningful and economically significant bond exists between them and the
local environment. Most of them prefer also to be consulted on future developments.
But communities will probably have tomove out, as prime grazing lands and cultivation
sites will be alienated from them. Foreign and highland Ethiopian labourers (there is
talk of 100,000) will move in, and local people will have little competitive power or
inclination to work on the plantations on the lands expropriated from them – if they
are allowed.
Environmental and social impact assessments (ESIA) of the dam have been made,
as required by Ethiopian and international law. The first environmental assessment
came in 2006 when construction started, but the more complete ESIA study came out
only about two years later, i.e. when construction had already advanced significantly,
and it drew a lot of criticism. Local people were consulted, but they were mainly
local administrators (i.e. government people), and none could change the plans, only
talk about some mitigating measures and compensation sums for what was to come.
The approval process for the project was suspect, because there was no competitive
bidding (thus easing the Ethiopian government’s commanding role but leading to the
withdrawal of various potential backers; cf. Mwanda 2011) and funding for the full
construction costs was not secured. Only the African Development Bank in 2010 gave
a loan of US$250 million, and has generally not been critical of the project. Later
the Italian government, in a bid to support the Italian construction company Salini
Costruttori SpA, the contractors of the dam, provided hundreds of millions of US
dollars as well. TheWorld Bank and the European Investment Bank did not participate.
In 2009 China, a close political and economic partner of the Ethiopian government,
provided US$500 million in equipment, funded by the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC).
Dam s tud i e s – expe r i e nces so f a r
Large dams for hydroelectric power generation aremaking a comeback because they are
seen as a quick road to ‘clean energy’ and, once the capital investment in the structures is
made, a relatively reliable source of electricity is available. Due to the continent’s natural
features, the ‘potential’ for hydroelectric power generation in Africa is always said to
be great. It has indeed become a new mantra of the development elite. Of Ethiopia it
is often said in official documents that the country has the potential to generate 45,000
7 Turton cites a 2010 statement by Salini Costruttori, the Gibe III builders, from where it appears
that the local people ‘are expected to switch from flood-retreat agriculture to more modern forms
of agriculture’. This statement reveals that ‘the controlled flood is not, and possibly never has been
seen by the dam builder as a permanent mitigating measure for downstream impacts’ (2010: 6). It
can be predicted that in, say, five to ten years’ time, this conclusion will be vindicated.
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MW in the future so that there is scope for much expansion – although this would mean
that most if not all suitable gorges and rivers in the entire country would have to be
dammed, and no attention would be paid to wider environmental, ecological, seismicity
and agronomic variables (apart even from the landscape-aesthetic ones).
There is a respectable tradition of comparative dam studies, with many from
anthropology (see Scudder 2005; Richter et al. 2010) and some of the conclusions
are that, while a substantial domestic energy resource is usually created, the following
drawbacks may occur: (a) significant environmental problems, among them loss of
biodiversity, loss of agrarian land, land slide problems, water seepage and evaporation;
(b) recurrent technical problems, such as silting of the reservoirs, seismic pressure and
unexpected construction weaknesses discovered after operating the dam; (c) proper
cost-benefit analyses are hardly made; livelihoods of people near the dam areas and
downstream are negatively impacted, ranging from loss of lands and livelihoods to
loss of resources and income, and displacement to poorer areas, rarely sufficiently
compensated (cf. Cernea and Mathur 2008); (d) more health problems may appear
among people close to the lake reservoirs (notably malaria or bilharzia; cf. Ligon et
al. 1995; Tedros et al. 1999); and (e) local people had little say, if any, in any dam
venture and government promises to compensate them or offer alternatives are rarely
kept. Interestingly, on the basis of local evidence, many dams are being reassessed,
for example the Chinese Three Gorges dam. China has recently admitted the serious
long-term problems with its Three Gorges dam (Hvistendahl 2008; Watts 2011). But it
has continued funding similar risky projects in Africa (Giles 2006), and still funds the
current Ethiopian dam-building ventures.
In Ethiopia itself there is also a perennial problem of the maintenance of projects,
structures and machines once built or installed, and of unforeseen environmental,
socio-economic and engineering problems, usually acknowledged only when serious
problems occur some years later. Upkeep of products delivered is weak, as is evident
from the Beles and Tekkeze dams, damaging performance and durability. Remarkably,
in the fever to build new dams the lessons of the past are not taken into account,
not even by the donor countries and institutions providing the funding. Studies of
the aftermath of various large Ethiopian dam projects (like the T’ana-Beles and the
Tekkeze), however, have made clear that they were not an unmitigated success and
have had disturbing social and environmental effects.8 Often small dams, while not
so spectacular, are much more suitable, as they are less vulnerable to mechanical and
engineering failure, avoid massive displacement and resettlement of people (cf. Richter
et al. 2010), and pose fewer maintenance problems.
Re l a t i o n o f t he G i be I I I d am and the su r r ound i ng
soc i o - e conom ic and soc i e t a l e nv i r o nmen t
Most prominent in the global discussion on the Gibe III dam’s impact is not the
threatened displacement of people in the immediate area of the dam, because most of
8 Cf. the analysis of an engineer on the drying out effect of the T’ana Beles scheme on Lake T’ana:
Grawa Samuel (2011) T’ana hayq derqo, beSudan t’eref sint’allel’ [‘While Lake Tana dries up it [the
water] is on display near the Sudan border’] (www.ethiomedia.com/andnen/tana_hayq_derqo.pdf
Accessed 10 June 2011). See also Gebre (2009) on resettlement problems and the general demise of
the Beles scheme (p. 123).
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the lake gorge is indeed sparsely populated or uninhabited; only some 230 families
were estimated to be moved, and the land lost is low-intensity pasture and hunting-
gathering territory. The threat is to the livelihoods of ca. 200,000 people downstream
(in Ethiopia) because of the disappearance of the floods and the recession of the water
level (Turton 2010: 4). At least a similar number of people in Kenya will also be affected,
due to the expected drying out of Lake Turkana and its delta, which may see a large
drop of its water level (cf. Avery 2010), reduced fish stocks, and perhaps more salinity
of the water so as to make it undrinkable and unsuitable for irrigation agriculture. In
addition, the Lower Omo Valley as well as Lake Turkana, a unique desert lake with
natural and economic value, are UNESCO World Heritage Sites (respectively since
1980 and 1997).9 The Valley is also an important location of hominid finds and ancient
habitation. Near the dam site itself, parts of two medieval defence walls of the Walaitta
andDawro kingdomswill be flooded by the future lake. In July 2011 theWorldHeritage
Committee of the UN called for a halt of the construction of Gibe III until all negative
impacts of the dam had been independently investigated and evaluated.10 It advised the
Ethiopian government to consider the universal heritage value of the Omo Valley and
called upon it to fulfil its obligations to protect the sites. Needless to say, the call was
brushed aside11 by government spokesmen in the usual denial mode, with Ethiopia on
the way to endanger universal heritage of humanity.
In southwest Ethiopia there are a number of ethnic groups living along the
downstream Omo banks: the Bodi, Mursi, Nyangatom, Kwegu, Chai, Kara, Bashada,
Me’en, and Dassanech, the latter living in and near the Omo delta near Lake Turkana.
They will lose not only some of their hunting and gathering areas but, as noted, also
their flood-retreat cultivation sites, which are currently an essential and stable food
production niche in an area with precarious rainfall. In addition, fishing and livestock
pasture areas will be sharply reduced and a general receding of groundwater reserves
will be seen also. This will undermine food security (already precarious in the region)
and trigger migrations and possibly more inter-group conflict. The government has
been quick to promise water pumps to enhance irrigated agriculture along the river
banks, but there are many practical and socio-cultural obstacles to this. And what the
government basically seems to have in mind is to lease the lands to new investors for
big irrigated agricultural schemes where displaced local people probably are envisaged
to be wage labourers.
Kenyans, including some MPs and local NGOs, have lodged complaints12 with
Ethiopia because of the threats to Lake Turkana and the negative impact on the
livelihoods of the Turkana, Elmolo, Rendille and other peoples, but – as expected –
the Kenyan government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ethiopian
government, agreeing to the dam without considering local effects in a (for them)
marginal area in the semi-arid North.
9 See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/17 (Accessed 20 May 2011).
10 See A. Ashine, ‘UN calls for suspension of giant Ethiopian hydropower dam’, Daily Nation
(Nairobi), 28 July 2011; J. Mwanda, ‘Ethiopia’s world heritage site tribes threatened’, International
News Magazine (Sydney), 1 August 2011.
11 As reported in ‘Ethiopia continues dam construction over UN objections’, Addis Fortune (Addis
Ababa), 7 August 2011.
12 Most recently in August 2011: see ‘MPs join opposition to Ethiopian dam’, Capital FM (Nairobi),
10 August 2010.
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There is no doubt that due to the dam construction the surrounding socio-economic
and societal environment will be irretrievably altered and that local peoples will have to
adapt and change (cf. Angelo 2010) to the point of abandoning most of their way of life.
There is no evidence that they will be given a choice in this. Formerly ‘isolated’, now
tourist-visited ‘tribal’ groups in the area will be more visible and connected to the wider
national society. Education, migration, socio-cultural assimilation and new economic
activitieswill follow, perhaps precededby a phase of disorientation andmore local group
conflict. No one in the local population doubts that income loss and economic decline
will affect the people impacted by the dam. In general, the promises of compensation
and provision of services are not believed. There are reports that protesters can land
in jail.13 In practice, the possibility to resist seems slim due to government pressure
and military presence. While previous studies of the impacts of dams (Richter et al.
2010; Scudder 2005; Cernea 2004) have advised government and aid agencies to consult
the locals and make them a partner in change, nothing of this kind seems to occur
in Ethiopia, except in a very formal, top-down manner. The enormous body of
sociological and anthropological knowledge on these societies, and on their value for
the comparative study of humankind, of local ecology, or of environmental practices, is
bypassed.
In addition, a general expectation for the wider natural environment in the dam
project areas is that species decline, deforestation and loss of biodiversity will result,
not only in the immediate dam location area but also downstream, because of the likely
receding of the river and of the lake and its changing chemical composition (with a
likelihood of it becoming more salty and alkaline).
The EEPCo Impact Assessments as well as critical reports by various concerned
experts, NGOs, advocacy groups and local people all indicate substantial effects and
impacts on the environment, socio-economic systems, livelihoods, and the social
organisation and culture of the people living near the dam or downstream. This is,
of course, to be expected in view of all the studies made on dams elsewhere. Only the
EEPCo reportsmake nothing of it, suggesting easy adjustments.Neither does themedia
noise about the ‘sustainable development’ impact of the Gibe III dam (and of the others
planned), claimed during a conference inAddisAbaba in 2011,14 demonstrate that for all
those impacted by the dams the idea of sustainability is valid. In the recommendations
of this conference,15 nothing is said on the role, value and knowledge of local peoples
and stakeholders living in the dam area.
D i ve r gen t v i ews on the dam
At least five, often antagonistic, positions can be distinguished on the use and impact
of the Gibe III dam, touching upon matters of basic engineering, economic use,
13 As has happened with those objecting to large-scale land acquisitions, see Ed Butler, ‘Land grab
fears for Ethiopian rural communities’, BBC news message, 16 October 2010 (www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-11991926) Accessed 5 May 2011. Survival International even reported that human
rights abuse was already on the way among local opponents of the dam: ‘Exposed: Ethiopia
gives farmland to foreigners while thousands starve’ (www.survivalinternational.org/news/7518)
Accessed 5 August 2011.
14 Sponsored by the Ethiopian government and the International Hydropower Association (IHA),
held 31 March–1 April 2011; see http://www.h4sd.info (Accessed 19 August 2011).
15 Downloadable from www.h4sd.info (Accessed 20 August 2011).
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environmental impact but also on those of state legitimacy, governance, developmental
obsessions, and the place of and respect for the local people affected. I summarise them
below.
Government positions
The Ethiopian government, led by the EPRDF as the sole ruling (vanguard) party for
20 years, expresses total and unconditional commitment to dam building in order to
develop the country.Dams are seen as necessary, and as the bestway to attain energy self-
sufficiency and boost the power of central government, whowill own them and operate
them. Few if any objections were listened to – not domestically, not internationally.
Public debate on the dam construction has been absent, it having become a dogma that
this was the right road to ‘poverty eradication and economic growth’. Interests of local
people or the environment seem immaterial, and any problems resulting from the dam
‘can be solved’. For critics, it is a case of state hubris in the classical sense.
Ethiopia’s PM has repeatedly expressed the state’s (ruling party’s) attitude best. In
August 2010 he vowed to complete the dam ‘at any cost’, saying about critics of the dam
that ‘They don’t want to see developed Africa; they want us to remain undeveloped and
backward to serve their tourists as a museum.’16 And in a speech on 2010 ‘Pastoralists’
Day’ in the southern town of Jinka, he said:
Our efforts to build a dam on the Omo River to eliminate the flood, to create a
huge irrigation system and give pastoralists a sustainable income and a modern
life, are facing roadblocks. Our limited capacity to execute this work, and limited
financial aid, did not allow us to go as fast as we wanted to. There are some people
who want to block our freedom to use our rivers, and to save our people from
poverty.
These words speak for themselves; no comment needed. He continued:
They just want to keep the pastoralists as a tourist attraction and make sure
no development happens in pastoral areas. They team up with the people who
don’t want us to use our rivers to broadcast their propaganda. There can’t be
anyone more concerned for our environmental conservation than we are. We are
determined to speed up our development in an environmentally-friendly way.We
want our people to have a modern life and we won’t allow our people to be a case
study of ancient living for scientists and researchers.17
The rest of the speech contained promises that all ‘backwardness’ of the local people
and their civilisations would be addressed. In this well-meant government discourse
there is no reflection on the value of alternative views or on the local knowledge or
the wishes of those people – their narrative is not taken seriously, because they are
backward, ignorant and not yet sharing in the graces of development (although all these
terms are of course very relative).
16 In New Business Ethiopia (an Ethiopian weekly), 11 August 2010.
17 Speech by PM Meles Zenawi during the 13th Annual Pastoralists’ Day celebrations, Jinka, South
Omo Zone, 25 January 2011.
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All state institutions and the ruling party follow suit. There are the state media,
the pro-government website Walta,18 and the various Ministries. Also EEPCo, as chief
agency responsible for the dam projects, gave its views. For instance, a report by the
EEPCoHead Office of August 2010 pictured no negative consequences of the Gibe III
dam whatsoever, on the surrounding area or on the peoples downstream, nor on the
biology and ecology of Lake Turkana (EEPCo 2010). Remarkably, even no hint was
made here to any of the concerns mentioned in EEPCo’s own previous 2008 reports
(EEPCo 2008a, 2008b), where adverse effects were at least recognised. The Gibe III
project also has its own website,19 which has no word on possible problems and mainly
sings praises of the project and its progress.
Also a significant part of the Ethiopian public, including in the diaspora, is proud of
the dam construction, seeing it as ‘empowering Ethiopia’ and raising its importance on
the African continent. They often adopt a blanket nationalist economic point of view,
countering critics with the statement that Ethiopia has the right to development and that
(Western) critics are ‘jealous’, or ‘denigrating Ethiopia’. No one would deny this right
‘to develop’. But in this approach the diversity of local interests and the risk of negative
impacts on certain peoples are all too easily bypassed. There is little if any evidence that
recent international conventions and declarations adopted in the UN on the rights of
‘tribal’ or indigenous peoples are being respected.20 Here the modernisation discourse
of the government has made converts to the extent that any discussion of such eventual
problems and disadvantages is avoided or delegitimised. The larger part of the politically
quite vocal Ethiopian diaspora, however, is against mega-dam building, seemingly not
primarily because of the specific project (Gibe III) but because of their general political
objections to the regime in place.21
International financial institutions and international law and monitoring
agencies
These groups of commentators and policy-making institutions have a facilitating role,
in practice usually supporting national developmental efforts and plans of developing
countries, providing expert advice, financial aid and legal counsel. They point to
legal obligations, impose conditions and call for following internationally agreed
upon protocols, such as environmental and social impact assessments and the legal
representation of stakeholders. Among these groups are the World Bank, the IMF,
the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank and USAID. Also the
World Commission on Dams (WCD), set up by two unlikely partners, theWorld Bank
and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), can be included
here. In 2000, this Commission issued a report stating that decisions to build large
hydroelectric dams must be guided by ‘indigenous people’s free, prior and informed
18 See ‘Gilgel Gibe III’s detractors continue their campaign’, Walta, 26 February 2011
(www.waltainfo.com/index.php?option = com_content&task = view&id = 25560&Itemid = 96).
19 See www.gibe3.com.et (Accessed 19 September 2011).
20 See the UNHCR Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (no. 169), theDeclaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Resolution
47/135, December 1992) and the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (A/61/L.67) of 7 September 2007.
21 Some also object to the generation of the huge debt that may result.
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consent to the project’ (WCD 2000). But this principle has not been applied (yet) to
the Gibe III dam. In its 2000 report the WCD also did not provide an estimate of
the impact of river flow alteration (to be major in the case of the dammed Omo) on
the downstream peoples and ecosystems (Richter et al. 2010: 15), although indications
are that such impact will be far-reaching. Occasionally, these international agencies
voice objections over the non-competitive bidding procedures for construction or on
the absence or neglect of proper (i.e. independent) environmental and social impact
assessments (ESIAs).
This categoryof institutions also remains rather dependent onnational governments
in developing countries and is also strongly embedded in, and subservient to,
international ‘donor discourse’, notably of the larger powers. Nevertheless, a study
by Avery (2010) for the African Development Bank has outlined a few major problems
of the project for the Lake Turkana environment and economy.
The world press and critical NGOs
Most criticisms, often rather alarmist, on dam building and impact assessment have
been offered by the international press, and increasingly bymany advocacy civil society
groups and NGOs. While the first aim to represent the whole gamut of interests and
describe the initial problems encountered, the latter make usually an unambiguous
choice against dam building and take the side of the people affected who are losing their
lands, livelihoods and socio-cultural heritage.
Characteristic of world press reporting has been an influential 2009 article by the
BBC’s Peter Greste, called ‘The dam that divides Ethiopians’.22 Journalists now find
it difficult to access the site of the dam and are rarely accorded interviews. This again
leads to more suspicion, criticism and breakdown of dialogue.
Various NGOs and interest groups are active in this domain of dam monitoring,
among them International Rivers, StopGibe3,23 Survival International (2009, 2010),
Friends of Lake Turkana,24 Indigenous Peoples of Africa, Campagna per la Riforma
della Banca Mondiale (2008), and the Bank Information Center and some have been
joined by big names, such asRichardLeakey, theKenyan scientist and conservationist.25
They are usually adamantly opposed to the building of the Gibe dams and request
governments, donor countries and international institutions to critically approach
dam projects, to apply the relevant legal clauses and guidelines for evaluating and
monitoring, and often to withhold funding for it if all ‘stakeholders’ are not consulted.
They also organised petitions (for instance, on World Water Day 201126) and targeted
demonstrations near the headquarters of such organisations. Characteristic headings
of International Rivers articles are: ‘Big dams: bringing poverty not power’, and
22 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm (Accessed 7 February 2011), with accompa-
nying video reports. Also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959814.stm (Accessed 10 February
2011).
23 See www.stopgibe3.org/pages/Main.php (Accessed 28 June 2011).
24 See www.friendsoflaketurkana.org (Accessed 10 June 2011).
25 See http://richardleakey.wildlifedirect.org/2009/02/03/climate-change-and-japans-krill-fishing-
are-devastating-the-antarctic (Accessed 9 October 2011).
26 See http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/7099 (Accessed 4 September 2011), mentioning
that 400 organisations had signed a petition against the dam.
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‘Ethiopia’s Gibe 3: sowing hunger and conflict.’27 Survival International (2010) noted:
‘Giant dam to devastate 200,000 tribal people in Ethiopia’.28 Ikal Angelei, director
of Friends of Lake Turkana, said in a statement in February 2011: ‘Construction
of Gibe III is the most outrageous social injustice of our time.’29 The approach
of these organisations is ecological or conservation-based and therefore legitimate,
but also protective and perhaps paternalistic to the local people and their ethno-
cultural traditions, thereby tending to somewhat underestimate their adaptive capacities
and agency. These organisations exert significant pressure but have mostly not been
successful in engaging the Ethiopian government or the international institutions in a
meaningful dialogue or exchange of views on the dam projects, and as a result both
parties become even more antagonistic.
Ethiopian diaspora political opposition
As domestic debate in Ethiopia, as well as civil society action critical of the dam ventures
withinEthiopia, is barred (notably following a very restrictiveNGOlaw issued in 2009),
the Internet is a major site for debates on controversial political issues, including on
the Gibe dam scheme. Websites of Ethiopian opposition groups are very vocal (cf.
Lyons 2007) and contain often strongly voiced but often well-documented critiques
on Ethiopian party/government policies. Interestingly, government people, especially
the Prime Minister or top policy advisors, often respond to such critiques in their own
speeches and statements, despite the fact that the Internet users and the general public
in Ethiopia are prevented from accessing the diaspora websites, because if censorship
by the sole Internet provider in Ethiopia (ETC).
Theoften vociferous tone of the diaspora cyber-criticismsundermines the substance
of relevant critiques issued on the samewebsites,30 and serves to polarise the issues. Both
the government and its radical critics thus construct a mutual recrimination discourse
that hardly advances debate on the merits of any policy, including dam building. One
website, for example, speaks of ‘dictatorial deathdams’31, another of ‘looming eco-geno-
cide’ due to the ‘destructive path’ of Gibe III.32 Such epithets cloud the discussion and
do neither good service to local people nor contribute to properly evaluating the serious
impact of the dams.
Independent experts and researchers
Several independent observers, experts and scholars have offered their reasoned views
on the Gibe controversy, giving technical, economic or social-science analyses of the
entire context or on aspects of it, such as the environmental and biodiversity impacts.
27 See www.internationalrivers.org for such papers (Accessed 12 September 2011).
28 See http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/5683 (Accessed 16 June 2011).
29 See ‘Groups to protest against China-funded dam’, at http://allafrica.com/stories/
201102210227.html (Accessed 20 June 2011).
30 Such sites also contain expert assessments that make good points, among them, Samuel and Samson
(2010), Mitchell (2009) and Johnston (2009, 2010).
31 See: www.ethiopianism.net/?cat=239 (Accessed 15 August 2011).
32 See Khadija Sharife (2010) ‘East Africa’s looming famine – Gibe III’ (www.huffingtonpost.
com/khadija-sharife/east-africas-looming-fami_b_577789.html Accessed 5 April 2011).
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Some called for following accepted international procedures of social assessment and
compensation, participatory policy, alternative livelihood procurement, and human
rights respect. Examples are Mitchell (2009), Samuel and Samson (2010, although on
Gibe II), Johnston (2009), ARWG (2009), the SOGREAH report (2010) and Turton
(2010). Some social scientists who know the Omo area well also have commented, for
example, in journalists’ reports,33 but few fieldwork-based contributions have yet been
made by social science researchers (except Turton 2010 and Johnston 2009, 2010) on
attitudes to the dam and its possible impacts. There are already a significant number
of studies allowing politicians, policy makers, researchers and constructors to picture
and take into account the ‘pre-dam social conditions’ (Richter et al. 2010: 25) of the
people to be affected. As I suggested above, it is advisable and legally warranted to use
this corpus of knowledge that sociologists, historians, geographers, anthropologists and
others have produced on these peoples over the past decades. It can help to understand
the history, the ecological management, social systems and also the humanity of these
societies, to assess their social and cultural features, and understand the future costs that
these peoples affected by dam projects may have to pay.34 This knowledge can then also
be drawn upon to design realistic ‘mitigation measures’ and adaptive mechanisms, to be
facilitated by the state. In a recent article inNature, Tollefson (2011) noted that at least
a ‘mechanism for evaluating, and perhaps mitigating, the impact of dams before they are
built’ [my emphasis, J.A.] would be advisable. This seems rational and self-evident, but
not all those involved are convinced of this or can even imagine it. All independent work
on the Gibe project concludes that the social and environmental impact aspects were
not considered with the necessary amount of caution and sensitivity and consistently
wish away any problems.
The local people
I discuss the local people here last, because, characteristically, little is known of their
ideas and opinions. There is a large gap in knowledge, both about their exact relation
to the lands they inhabit as well as their viewpoints: they were not asked or rarely
consulted by policy makers, experts or independent researchers, and as yet no one
can speak for them. They are not even recognised as ‘indigenous’ (see note 35) by the
Ethiopian government. But several media articles contain interviews with local people,
and various social scientists, including some anthropologists, have given estimates, based
on in-depth knowledge and recent visits to the area. But clearly more comprehensive
research is needed. In an influential BBC article, one of the Mursi community leaders
said that they were never officially informed of the dam and that ‘We will suffer because
there will be no more floods . . . I don’t think the government likes the Omo tribes.
33 See theBBCreport at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959814.stm (Accessed 10February 2011).
34 There is also the international context, already referred to above: the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN on 13 September 2007 states, inter alia, that ‘States
shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources’
(www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html) Accessed 2 May 2011.
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They are going to destroy us.’ Nyangatom people cited said that they did not
believe or understand the government in its promises of providing irrigation
schemes.35
Most of the ‘consulting’ of local people seems to have been done by the Gibe III
project Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EEPCo 2008a, with another one
in January 2009 by CESI and Mid-Day Consulting 2009), for which the authors stated
to have talked to about 2000 people. But only 80 were from directly affected Lower
Omo area ethnic groups, most of them administrators (EEPCo 2008a: 198–200), and the
findings and measures proposed were minimal (EEPCo 2008b: 158). The Additional
Study on Downstream Impact (EEPCO 2008c) was very thorough, but again very
meagre on community consultation (pp. 160–2). Informants’ input could not change
anything, because the terms were biased. The problem was also, as said above, that
these social assessments came almost two years after the construction of the dam had
started and with all plans already determined and approved by the state authorities. In
addition, the experiences so far of impact assessment and redress mechanisms in similar
grand schemes, such as T’ana Beles, Tekkeze and resettlement projects, do not inspire
much confidence. In view of land and water scarcity, poorer environmental conditions,
loss of livestock holdings, policies of ethnic closure that have reduced the absorptive
capacity of local societies to resettlers, and low compensation sums and inputs provided
by the government, people downstream will face, certainly in the initial stages, serious
declines of livelihood and well-being.
Important information on the local situation and people’s views was also provided
by Turton (2010), a long-time researcher and expert on the Lower Omo region. His
contribution, basedonvisits in 2010 to the impact area downstream, confirmed themany
insecurities and adverse consequences feared by local ethnic groups. Interestingly, he
noted that one of the reasons given by the Ethiopian authorities for building the dam
was to prevent seasonal floods that allegedly had killed ‘hundreds of people’, notably
in 2006 (EEPCo 2008c: 141). But in interviews with Turton, local Dassanetch and
Nyangatom individuals were not able to recall any victims of such a flood. Floods do
occur, but people are used to them and the casualty figures seem to be incorrect and
exaggerated.
My own interviews with representatives of two other ethnic groups from the
Lower Omo area in Addis Ababa in September 2010 and October 2011 revealed
great apprehension about the uncertain future (for example, they expect more food
insecurity), with a rejection of projected new irrigation-based mega-plantations on
their grazing lands, and even fears of group conflicts due to disputes about grazing
land and water in the wake of the dam construction. They also had little confidence
in the compensation sums and the plans for irrigation and pump installation that were
promised. They were ambivalent about the expected loss of tourist income (because
this phenomenon was already contested), and also rejected official statements by the
authorities that they had a ‘backward civilisation’ or were all ‘poor’ or ‘unemployed’.
This is indeed one of themost sensitive points: it is one thing to observe that local people
could benefit more from measured and considerate state support, but for ‘developers’
35 Other local views are presented in the short video documentary by M. Angelo (www.youtube.
com/watch?v=otpu8bcOzv0 Accessed 2 September 2011) of the Kara people, and in the
campaign video on Turkana Lake made by International Rivers (www.youtube.com/watch?v=
0mFjZnKeOnE&feature=player_embedded#at=17 Accessed 2 September 2011).
C© 2012 European Association of Social Anthropologists.
140 JON ABBINK
to deny them (they are also citizens) the human and survival value of their ways of life
is problematic, to say the least.
The dammay in theory carry benefits for the local people. But seeing this impending
decline in livelihoods, living spaces and environment (cf. Richter et al. 2010: 15), and the
constant denigration of their so-called ‘primitive and backwardway of life’, as expressed
in official state documents, as well as the bypassing of their existence and interests, does
not bode well (RNW 2011). The discourse of belittling the people and seeing their
sacrifices unquestioningly as necessary for the ‘greater good’ recalls the long historical
experience of suffering that rural Ethiopians have endured (cf. Dessalegn 2009: 24 on
the highland peasants, admirably expressing this). This condition of suffering may now
be entering a new phase, this time affecting the southern agro-pastoralists.
These five categories of ‘stakeholders’ hardly meet in a shared discursive space,
despite efforts to redefine and reshape reality: some because they do not feel the need
(like the state and someof the international players), others because they appeal to reason
and public opinion only or assume the role of attorney for local peoples (advocacy
groups, activists), or are powerless (local peoples). Neither is there a legal process
for negotiating the plans and adapting or confronting them with customary laws and
local practices that have been resilient for so long: state policy is a non-negotiable
space.
‘ Gove r nance ’ a spec t s : t he p r oduc t i o n o f d i s pensab l e
sub j ec t s?
The last category of voices discussed above was that of the local people in the lower
Gibe-Omo river basin. Here the nature of governance in neo-modernist states is
most clearly articulated. The resurging development discourse and the economic–
technocratic approach to natural and social engineering confirms local people as
obstacles, as ‘resistant material’ that has to be processed and treated in a specific manner.
They are seen as having little or no specific contribution to offer. Their practical, or as
Scott (1998: 6–7, 335) called itmetis, knowledge is not deemed relevant. Their status and
alleged socio-cultural ‘backwardness’ can be remedied by displacement, re-education
and training, so as to allow them to ‘partake’ of modernity and development. No
tolerance is displayed of their customary livelihoods because they are declared by state
leaders and policy-makers as ‘non-sustainable’. (This is no doubt the reason why these
pastoral peoples and cultivators have survived in this area for hundreds of years . . . ).
As a matter of fact, the global discourse on Millennium Development Goals and
development emanating from donor countries and UN agencies constantly reiterates
this point of ‘backwardness’– despite the formal calls made in their research reports to
properly deal with human development factors. This global discourse was taken over
uncritically and carried further by the Ethiopian state – there is no effort to modify
or build on local models and approaches to development; it hereby falls back on the
old pattern of the ‘politics of emulation’ (cf. Clapham 2006), seeking again models and
solutions from abroad. Obviously Ethiopia is not the only case, but it is indicative of
the wider trend and goes to show the pervasiveness of the global, prescriptive model of
development. Only time will tell whether the Ethiopian state can keep up its claims to
control socio-political processes or at some point make compromises in its practices of
governance.
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Focusing on the issue of ‘subject formation’, I come back to Scott’s pioneering
analysis (1998) of ‘seeing-like-a-state mechanisms’. He claimed (1998: 4–5) that four
characteristics are usually recognisable in state efforts at social engineering and making
subject populations ‘legible’ to the state: (a) a simplifying, administrative ordering of
nature and society; (b) a high-modernist ideology geared to the expansionof production,
the use of a ‘scientific-technical’ approach and planning, and a quest to master nature;
(c): an authoritarian state willing to use coercive power to realise its aims; and (d) a
prostrate civil society incapable of effectively resisting those plans. It is no exaggeration
to say that in Ethiopia these conditions have been fulfilled. The issue of the decentring
of citizens’ political relevance and agency is enhanced in the Ethiopian dam schemes
because of the accompanying plans to start massive, foreign-run irrigation schemes and
plantations to be stockedwith thousands of foreign importedworkers andmanagement.
This socio-economic population engineeringmay yield profits for the state treasury and
increase agricultural exports. But it will also underline the disempowerment of local
people (who are not enabled to take the lead in rural development) and thus confirms
their subject status. The foreign worker communities are not accountable to anyone but
theEthiopian government and, being dependent on it, they cannot ask for rights andwill
not strike. Thus central state power is strengthened, local citizens’ status diminished.
Some critics have labelled this innovative form of governance as state feudalism. The
concomitant result is that the state’s subjects are, in a way, dispensable, or as Tanya
Li suggested, ‘surplus’ (2009: 68): they have little political autonomy and are accorded
only marginal agency – at least in the regions discussed here. In the case of the peoples
of Lower Omo region, a cultural dimension is added to it: they are always declared
to be in need of reform and ‘civilising’ to bring them into line with modernity and
with the dominant society’s norms (which apparently have no problems and are the
ideal).
Conc l u s i o n : t he c l a sh o f na r r a t i v e s and t he
( un )mak i ng o f po l i t i c a l s ub j ec t s
Dam building in developing countries is a prime locus of state assertion and governance
claims and can certainly prove to be a beneficial investment in the energy infrastructure
of a developing country. As such, a categorical judgment on the (un)desirability of
dams is not in order, in general or on the Gibe III dam. Problematic is, however,
that their development and construction are in many countries conceived as inviolable
exercises immune to critique, negotiation or amendment. This includes Ethiopia. In
line with the authoritarian nature of its political system and the virtual imperviousness
of the political elite to consultative debate or compromise, dam building has become
a national developmental obsession in the country, and one that in practice cannot be
questioned. Citizens may be informed and ‘consulted’, but they cannot alter the plans
– this has been clear in all the official statements made. This underlines that the making
of dams in Ethiopia, as elsewhere (cf. Mitchell 2002: 21, 38, 45, on Egypt), is clearly
also an exercise in state-making and regime consolidation. Techno-economic projects
conducted by central state authorities are presented as depoliticised, ‘necessary’ ventures
but (re)define the powers of the state, advance its hegemonic governance model, and
shape citizens in the process: displaceable, expendable subjects that can be relocated and
re-educated. In some cases this entails the typical unreflected, modernist approach to
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citizen making, ordering people to leave behind their ‘backward ways of life’. That this
approach and the policies resulting from itmay even be in contravention to the letter and
spirit of national constitutional clauses seems not to bother anyone. It is thus remarkable
to see how resilient the old topoi of top-down state-making and ‘disciplining’ are, even
in this global day and age. The locals, with their ‘vernacular’ or me´tis knowledge
(Scott 1998) of the socio-economic conditions and ecology of their own society, are
not appreciated and are, in a political sense, ‘surplus’ subjects in the wider scheme of
things.
In addition, the apparent incommensurability of the various discursive accounts
or positions of the Ethiopian dam project and its likely impact, as outlined above,
is produced by the very nature of developmental governance and power as practised
by the sovereign surveillance state and its ruling party. Inheritor of a statist if not
Marxist political ideology turned developmentalist, it sees its mode of non-negotiable
governance as the preferred way to secure domestic stability as well as international
funding.
In the ongoing global efforts to raise GDP levels and enhance development,
conceived materially and ‘universally’, in most countries the ecological resources
dependent on me´tis knowledge and management are in danger of being irreparably
damaged, and the socio-cultural structures replete with such local, practical and often
adaptive skills are sidelined or devalued. The totalising and simplifying narrative
of statecraft in the modernising mode – with states as a kind of franchise of a
transnational institutional discourse – has indeed received new leases of life in the
current competitive, globalising conditions, despite the planetary crisis of social
and environmental management36 and the limits of the unfettered economic growth
models.
Jon Abbink
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